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Coronavirus disease of 2019 (COVID-19)’s devastating effects on the 
physical and mental health of the public are unlike previous medical 
crises, in part because of people’s collective access to communication 
technologies. Unfortunately, a clear understanding of the diffusion of 
health information on social media is lacking, which has a potentially 
negative impact on the effectiveness of emergency communication. 
This study applied social network analysis approaches to examine 
patterns of #COVID19 information flow on Twitter. A total of 1,404,496 
publicly available tweets from 946,940 U.S. users were retrieved 
and analyzed. Particular attention was paid to the structures of 
retweet and mention networks and identification of influential users: 
information sources, disseminators, and brokers. Overall, COVID-19 
information was not transmitted efficiently. Findings pointed to the 
importance of fostering connections between clusters to promote 
the diffusion in both networks. Lots of localized clusters limited the 
spread of timely information, causing difficulty in establishing any 
momentum in shaping urgent public actions. Rather than health and 
communication professionals, there was dominant involvement of 
non-professional users responsible for major COVID-19 information 
generation and dissemination, suggesting a lack of credibility and 
accuracy in the information. Inadequate influence of health officials 
and government agencies in brokering information contributed 
to concerns about the spread of dis/misinformation to the public. 
Significant differences in the type of influential users existed across 
roles and across networks. Conceptual and practical implications for 
emergency communication strategies are discussed.
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Since the first case of Coronavirus Disease of 2019 
(COVID-19) was confirmed in the United States on 
January 21, 2020, over 13 million people in the U.S. 
have confirmed cases of COVID-19. Despite multiple 
national- and state-wide interventions and prevention 
measures including banning non-essential travel and 
stay-at-home orders, on April 12, the USA became the 
nation with the most deaths globally. As of December 
2, the U.S. death toll surpassed 271,000.
Providing up-to-date, accurate information, deli-
vering key messages timely to the public, and 
controlling the spread of dis/misinformation can play a 
crucial role in managing epidemics (Homeland Security 
Council (US), 2006; World Health Organization, 2009; 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014; 
Department of Homeland Security, 2018). COVID-19’s 
devastating effects on the physical and mental health 
of the public are unlike previous medical crises, 
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in part because of people’s collective access to 
communication technologies. COVID-19 is the first 
pandemic of its kind in the age of social media. The 
amount and nature of information available to the public 
has changed significantly and is constantly evolving. 
Unfortunately, a crucial but surprisingly understudied 
phenomenon is the diffusion of health information on 
social media (Zhou et al., 2018; Aramburu et al., 2020).
Twitter, a microblogging service, has become 
one of the most important sources of realtime news 
updates, with more than 64 million users in the U.S. 
(Kemp, 2020). According to a recently published Pew 
Research Center report, 68% of American adults 
get news on social media and 71% of Twitter users 
responded they use it to get daily news (Matsa and 
Shearer, 2018).
Twitter users send and receive short posts called 
tweets about any topic. Tweets can be up to 280 
characters long and can include user mentions and 
keywords. Users can forward other users’ tweets 
and these forwarded messages are called retweets. 
Mentions can be used with the at symbol “@” before a 
username to identify a specific user. By retweeting or 
mentioning, users are interacting with other users and 
share information in a conversation-like manner (Wang 
et al., 2015). The hashtag symbol “#” can be used 
before a relevant keyword to initiate conversations 
or contribute to discussions of existing topics by 
showing their tweets in Twitter search. The use of the 
hashtag on Twitter indicates self-association of a user 
with an issue (Gruzd et al., 2011; Gleason, 2013).
As users interact in Twitter space, they form 
connections that emerge into complex social 
network structures. Essentially, the connections 
are asymmetric, since a user who is retweeted or 
mentioned by another user does not necessarily 
have to reciprocate by retweeting or mentioning them 
back. Due to this asymmetry, users can re-create and 
reinforce traditional hierarchical network structures in 
Twitter by relying on just a few information sources 
or by choosing to limit interactions to a select group 
of similar others (Himelboim et al., 2017). Thus, the 
connections built among users are indicators of 
information sharing and network structures reflect 
patterns of information flow (Himelboim et al., 2017; 
Majmundar et al., 2018). 
There are many studies that have examined the 
structure of communication networks on Twitter that 
provide insights about information flow during political 
campaigns and social movements (Himelboim et al., 
2012; Ansari, 2013; Harris et al., 2014; Kruikemeier, 
2014; Shin et al., 2017, 2018; Recuero et al., 2019). The 
patterns of communication and influential groups can 
vary across topics, cultures, or languages. Although 
few recent studies investigated Ebola information 
dissemination patterns (Harris et al., 2018; Liang et al., 
2019), their analysis was limited to retweet network, 
which together with mention network can provide an 
understanding of information flow on Twitter (Conover 
et al., 2011). To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study to examine both the retweet and mention 
networks to understand the diffusion of health 
information on Twitter among Americans during a 
pandemic.
Structural characteristics were examined at 
the network level to address our overarching 
research question: Is the current Twitter’s COVID-19 
communication network effectively leveraged to 
facilitate the flow of valid information during this crisis? 
Information can diffuse most effectively during crises 
if the network is sufficiently dense with low rates of 
clustering (Himelboim et al., 2017). Ideally, the Twitter 
COVID-19 communication network would have large 
audience and spread information quickly. Thus, we 
evaluated information flow in the retweet and mention 
networks with particular attention paid to its connectivity, 
modularity and direction of information flow.
Influential COVID-19 Twitter users were identified 
as information sources, disseminators and brokers. 
Ideally, COVID-19 information sources would be 
medical/health professionals to emphasize credibility, 
disseminators would be communication/journalism 
professionals to maximize reach, and brokers would 
be public health and government officials to ensure 
that information is accurate and continues to flow 
(World Health Organization, 2009; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). Thus, the aim 
of this study was to determine the characteristics 
of COVID-19 Twitter users by comparing the pro-
fessional categorizations by their roles as sources, 
disseminators, or brokers in the retweet and mention 
networks. We hope this study will significantly 
contribute to public health by helping devise more 
effective emergency communication strategies and 




We retrieved all publicly available tweets and user 
information from April 13, 2020, 08:00:00 AM, to 
April 16, 2020, 07:59:59 AM, GMT (UTC +0), using 
the Twitter API with the query “contains: #COVID19 
and country code: USA and language: English.” This 
time period was chosen because the U.S. became 
the nation with the highest number of deaths due to 
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COVID-19 on April 12 and it was predicted the highest 
U.S. daily death rate would occur on April 15. We 
selected 8 AM (instead of midnight) as the temporal 
boundary between days because the number of 
tweets started increasing around 8 AM and reached 
its peak around 8 PM each day. Figure 1 shows the 
distribution of the tweets that used #COVID19 during 
the study period. The Twitter users’ usernames, 
tweets, hashtags, retweet and mention relationships 
and self-descriptions were collected. We did not 
include replies to reduce the likelihood of repetition, 
losing context information, or producing unreliable 
data caused by Twitter’s new feature, “hide reply.”
Construction of retweet and mention 
networks
The data were converted into social network format 
using the R package “rtweet” (Kearney, 2019). We 
constructed retweet and mention networks as 
previously reported (Yang and Counts, 2010; Harris 
et al., 2014; Takeichi et al., 2015; Himelboim et al., 
2017). In the retweet network, each node represents a 
Twitter user and a directed edge is attached from user 
B to user A, if user B retweets a tweet originally posted 
by user A. The mention network was constructed in 
the same manner based on @username mentioning. 
That is, a directed edge is constructed from B to A, if 
user B mentions user A in his/her tweet. The opposite 
directions of edges in these networks therefore 
represent potential pathways for information flow. 
Figure 2 shows (a) how we built the networks and (b) 
how information is spread in the networks.
These two network datasets contained a total of 
1,404,496 directed relationships (ties) from 946,940 
users (nodes). The R package “igraph” (Csardi and 
Nepusz, 2006) was used to calculate network-
level and user-level metrics, to identify overall 
network structures and influential users and to 
provide insights for information flow. Analyses were 
conducted on the whole three-day set, separately on 
retweet and mention networks in order to compare 
them.
The networks were visualized using the library 
“NetworkX” (Hagberg et al., 2008) for programming 
language Python. In order to focus on detailed 
elements and to give a spatial understanding of 
social relations (i.e., segregation, interaction, and 
clustering), smaller networks were created using one-
hour subsets of the data (Martin III, 2012; Moody 
et al., 2005). The time period of April 13, 2020, 
05:00:00 PM to 05:59:59 PM, GMT (UTC +0), was 
chosen for the subset to display because it provided 
a finer representation of network structures than 
other time periods and it had the largest amount of 
information for both retweet and mention networks 
that our lab computers could analyze. The subset 
network’s structure was representative of the whole 
network. Initial visualizations were attempted on each 
one-hour subset individually and results were very 
similar, so the finest representation was included in 
the current study. The coefficient of variation (CV) was 
calculated for each of the network measures: CVs for 
degree centrality=0.34 for the retweet and 0.37 for the 
mention networks across 72 one-hour subsets; CVs for 
density=0.58 for the retweet and 0.62 for the mention 
Figure 1: Volume of #COVID19 tweets from April 13, 2020, 08:00:00 AM, to April 16, 2020, 
07:59:59 AM, GMT (UTC +0), with 5 minutes time intervals.
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networks across 72 one-hour subsets, respectively. 
This indicates the network metric values for the 
separate one-hour slices are relatively similar.
Network level
Understanding the overall structure of a network is 
key for understanding how information flows among 
its users (Hinds and McGrath, 2006; Hossain and 
Kuti, 2010; Valente, 1995, 2010). Typical network 
level metrics are size, average path length, network 
diameter, rates of reciprocity and transitivity, density, 
as well as clustering measured as the degree of 
modularity and the network average clustering 
coefficient. Twitter users often form clusters 
composed of users who are more interconnected 
among themselves than others in the network. 
Within clusters, information tends to flow fast, while 
across clusters information flow is often restricted 
by limited connectivity available across clusters. We 
identified clusters using the Clauset–Newman–Moore 
algorithm to define the boundaries of information flow 
(Clauset et al., 2004). Modularity of each network was 
computed to measure the interconnectedness of 
Figure 2: Toy networks: (a) retweet and mention networks; (b) information diffusion network;  
(c) influential user identification in the retweet and mention networks.
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clusters using the Girvan–Newman algorithm (Girvan 
and Newman, 2002). Higher scores indicated that 
the clusters are more distinct or separated from one 
another (range 0=clusters completely overlap to 1=no 
connections between clusters). While modularity 
captures the extent to which clusters are distinct 
from one another, it is often unable to detect small 
clusters (Fortunato and Barthelemy, 2007; Kaalia and 
Rajapakse, 2019). To investigate the network in more 
depth, density between clusters was calculated as 
the sum of existing ties between two clusters divided 
by total possible number of ties between them (range 
0=no connection to 1=complete connection).
User level
In-degree, out-degree, and betweenness centrality 
metrics were used to identify influential users 
(Freeman, 1979; Valente, 2010). Although there is 
no fixed ratio or standard approach to identify the 
number of influential users in a given network, top 
10 users with highest centrality scores or more has 
been considered enough to provide an indication 
of major direction of information flow in previous 
studies (Anger and Kittl, 2011; Himelboim et al., 2017; 
Recuero et al., 2019; Giglou et al., 2020). Given the 
large size of our data, this study identified a total of 
600 influential users from the retweet and mention 
networks. On Twitter, retweets and mentions are sent 
from one user to another. The predominant direction 
of such connections determines the information flow. 
In-degree centrality measures the number of times a 
user received retweets or mentions and those with 
high in-degree indicate the user is a major source 
of information for others (Yang and Counts, 2010; 
Morris et al., 2012; Littau and Jahng, 2016). Thus, 
we identified users who had the top 100 in-degree 
scores in each network as information sources. Out-
degree centrality measures the number of outgoing 
connections a user has. If a user frequently retweets 
or mentions other users, the user will have high out-
degree, and high out-degree will indicate the user 
is an initiator of large proportions of ties. Thus, we 
identified users who had the top 100 out-degree 
centrality scores in each network as information 
disseminators. Betweenness centrality measures the 
frequency a user lies on the shortest path between 
other users (Freeman, 1977, 1979). A user with high 
betweenness has more information passing through 
them and a higher number of other people depend 
on that user to get information, and without that 
user, groups of people will be much less connected. 
Thus, we can use this metric to find users who are 
communication controllers in a given network. We 
identified users who had the top 100 betweenness 
centrality scores in each network as information 
brokers. We assume that all of the connections in 
these networks can diffuse information equally and 
so centrality measures were not weighted.
During public health emergencies, health 
professionals have an important role to ensure the 
quality of shared information; likewise, the roles of 
communication professionals to timely disseminate the 
information with clear directions and of government 
officials to manage and maintain information flow 
are crucial in mitigating the effects of a pandemic 
(World Health Organization, 2009; Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2014). Interaction 
and cooperation between health professionals, 
communication professionals, and the government are 
critical during a pandemic (World Health Organization, 
2009; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2014). After identifying the information sources, 
disseminators and brokers, a conceptual assessment 
was conducted to under stand the nature of influential 
users in the retweet and mention networks. Regarding 
the nature of users, we classified the users into four 
types, based on their self-descriptions. Healthcare 
providers and researchers/scientists were classified 
as health professionals. People who disseminate news 
and information to serve the public interest such as 
media broadcasters, journalists, and reporters were 
classified as communication professionals. Politicians, 
policy makers, and national agencies were classified 
as government officials. Public figures and all other 
ordinary individuals who are simply using Twitter 
to share personal views were classified as non-
professionals. The user type classification results were 




The retweet network had 646,183 ties from 438,821 
users, whereas the mention network had 758,313 ties 
from 531,019 users. Overall, COVID-19 information 
was not transmitted efficiently. In both networks, 
information flowed in one direction; the flow was slow; 
both retweet and mention networks were sparse and 
consisted of many small clusters; the clusters were 
disconnected from each other; and shared information 
was less likely to reach the entire group. Both networks 
exhibited quite similar structure. Table 1 summarizes 
metrics from the network level analyses.
In both retweet and mention networks, low levels 
of mutuality of connections among users indicated 
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the information flow is unidirectional: retweet network, 
reciprocity=0.268% and transitivity=0.016%; and 
mention network, reciprocity = 0.482% and transitivity 
=0.018%. Both networks exhibited long average path 
lengths, implying information may diffuse slowly and 
less evenly: on average, users were separated by 12 
others in the retweet network and 17 others in the 
mention network. Both networks were divided into a 
large number of clusters: 12,519 clusters in retweet 
network and 28,528 clusters in mention network. 
Information was not likely to be shared between 
clusters: average clustering coefficients calculated 
for each network were 0.012 in retweet network 
and 0.008 in mention network. Users had dense 
connections with other users within clusters but sparse 
connections between users in different clusters: 
although it was slightly lower in retweet network, both 
networks revealed high modularity with scores of 0.782 
in retweet network and 0.797 in mention network. 
Both retweet and mention networks showed very low 
density: density scores were 0.0000034 in retweet 
network and 0.0000027 in mention network.
User level
Degree analyses revealed that a very small number 
of users determined the major COVID-19 information 
flow in both retweet and mention networks. The 
degree distributions in both networks tended to be 
scale-free, suggesting a hierarchical structure.
The in-degree values of all users in the retweet 
network ranged between 0 and 11,954 (N=438,821, 
M=1.47, Med=0), the out-degree values between 
0 and 158 (N=438,821, M=1.47, Med=1), and the 
betweenness values between 0 and 43,409,213 
(N=438,821, M=2,894.66, Med=0). In the mention 
network, the in-degree values of all users ranged 
between 0 and 11,608 (N=531,019, M=1.43, Med=0), 
the out-degree values between 0 and 187 (N=531,019, 
M=1.43, Med=1), and the betweenness values between 
0 and 215,538,020 (N=531,019, M=16,452.62, Med=0). 
All degree distributions were highly right-skewed: 
retweet network, skewness and kurtosis scores 
were 132.10 and 21,154.49 for in-degree, 12.43 and 
491.54 for out-degree, and 123.89 and 19,750.70 for 
betweenness; mention network, 140.25 and 24,930.94 
for in-degree, 13.22 and 537.58 for out-degree, and 
125.39 and 17,758.65 for betweenness.
The in-degree of the identified information sources 
(top 100) in the retweet network was between 705 
and 11,954 (N=100, M=2,681, Med=1,506), the out-
degree of the identified information disseminators 
was between 32 and 158 (N=100, M=47, Med=38), 
and the betweenness of the identified information 
brokers was between 2,728,657 and 43,309,213 
(N=100, M=9,433,471, Med=6,886,086). In the men-
tion network, the in-degree of the identified infor-
mation sources was between 749 and 11,608 (N=100, 
M=2,560, Med=1,815), the out-degree of the identified 
information disseminators was between 39 and 187 
(N=100, M=62, Med=52), and the betweenness 
of the identified information brokers was between 
15,904,090 and 215,538,020 (N=100, M=67,239,434, 
Med=40,851,672). Table 2 compares the summary 
statistics of the degree distribution of influential users 
and of all users.
Both networks followed a power-law degree 
distribution, providing evidence of scale-free, 
hierarchical structures: in-degree α=0.957, R2=0.694, 
p<0.001 and out-degree α=1.860, R2=0.961, p<0.001 
were calculated in the retweet network; in-degree 
α=1.019, R2=0.704, p<0.001 and out-degree α=1.980, 
R2=0.964, p<0.001 were calculated in the mention 
network. Figure 3 shows the scale-free in-and out-
degree distributions on a log–log scale with the raw 
score distributions on a histogram.
The user type classification results revealed that, 
in both networks, the major COVID-19 information 
being shared among Twitter users was primarily 
authored by non-professionals and government 
officials; the information was primarily disseminated 




Number of nodes 438,821 531,019
Number of edges (directed) 646,183 758,313
Diameter (largest connected 
component)
35 46
Average path length 12.09 16.58
Reciprocity 0.002678 0.004815
Transitivity 0.000161 0.000182





Density < 0.001 < 0.001
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by non-professionals; and health professionals played 
a major role in brokering information. The classified 
types of influential users in different roles in each 
network were all statistically significantly different 
from one another (all ps<0.001). Significant difference 
across networks was observed in the composition of 
the identified information brokers at α=0.10: Brokers in 
the retweet network were most frequently healthcare 
providers and ordinary citizens, with a near absence 
of government officials whereas brokers in the 
mention network were most often research scientists 
followed by healthcare workers. Table 3 summarizes 
the results of user level analyses. Table 4 shows 
the p-values obtained from user type composition 
comparison across roles and across networks using 
Fisher’s exact test.
Retweet network
Information sources, the top 100 on in-degree, 
were almost evenly divided among the four user 
types: health professionals, 20%; communication 
professionals, 16%; government officials, 28%; and 
non-professionals, 36%. In contrast, information 
disseminators, the top 100 on out-degree, were 
predominately non-professionals, 76% (with 95% 
of them being ordinary people); and a handful of 
communication professionals, 18%. Information 
Table 2. Centrality statistics for influential and all other users in both networks.
Retweet Mention
Influential users All users Influential users All users
 In-degree N=100 N=438,821 N=100 N=531,019
 Mean 2,681 1.47 2,560 1.43
 SD 2,689 58.23 2,364 48.13
 Median 1,506 0 1,815 0
 Min. 705 0 749 0
 Max. 11,954 11,954 11,608 11,608
 Skewness 132.10 140.25
 Kurtosis 21,154.49 24,930.94
 Out-degree N=100 N=438,821 N=100 N=531,019
 Mean 47 1.47 62 1.43
 SD 23 1.78 29 2.09
 Median 38 1 52 1
 Min. 32 0 39 0
 Max. 158 158 187 187
 Skewness 12.43 13.22
 Kurtosis 491.54 537.58
 Betweenness N=100 N=438,821 N=100 N=531,019
 Mean 9,433,471 2,894.66 67,239,434 16,452.62
 SD 7,976,886 188,252.40 58,763,864 1,230,822
 Median 6,886,086 0 40,851,672 0
 Min. 2,728,657 0 15,904,090 0
 Max. 43,309,213 43,309,213 215,538,020 215,538,020
 Skewness 123.89 125.39
 Kurtosis 19,750.70 17,758.65
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brokers, the top 100 on betweenness, were 
predominately health professionals, 48% (with 
most being healthcare providers, 60%); and non-
professionals being most of the remainder, 27%.
Mention network
The mention network followed a similar pattern with 
information sources being almost evenly divided 
among the four user types: health professionals, 19%; 
communication professionals, 18%; government 
officials, 34%; and non-professionals, 29%. Infor-
mation disseminators, as in the retweet network, 
were predominately non-professionals, 69% (with 
93% of them being ordinary people); and a handful 
of communication professionals, 17%. Information 
brokers were predominately health professionals, 
57%, although in this case these health professionals 
were more likely to be researchers/scientists 
(61%); and government (16%) and communication 
professionals (15%) primarily the remainder.
Visualization
The one-hour subset data for the retweet network 
visualization consisted of 14,255 ties from 15,907 users. 
The subset data for the mention network visualization 
consisted of 16,379 ties from 19,386 users. Figure 4 
visually depicts the structures and information flow of 
retweet network and mention network.
The size and color of the nodes were made 
proportional to the unweighted in-degree centrality 
score of each user. The ties between users 
represented the information exchange links between 
the users. Directions of ties were ignored. Attention 
was focused on the overall degree distribution and 
connectivity between high degree users (information 
sources) and lower degree users to help reveal the 
overall network structure and information flow. 
Spatialization was used to draw nodes with more ties 
to more central positions.
In both networks, a hierarchical structure was 
apparent and information flow was concentrated 
Figure 3: Scale free in-degree and out-degree distributions on a log-log scale for retweet and 
mention networks.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































at the center where influential users are located. A 
significant portion of users in both networks were 
connected to only a few others, whereas a few users 
had a huge proportion of connections. Both networks 
exhibited a large core cluster, comprised of a small 
number of high degree users – represented by bigger 
and brighter nodes in the figure – surrounded by 
a large number of less influential users and small 
clusters. In both networks, information brokers played 
a central role in information diffusion; connections 
between more influential users and less influential 
users were mediated by others or clusters. In the 
retweet network, dense interconnections among 
influential users, connecting each of their clusters 
with another, were observed.
Implications
Despite Twitter’s reputation as an effective medium to 
connect people and facilitate public communication, 
the topic of COVID-19 did not bring its users together. 
Both the retweet and mention networks were sparsely 
connected, exhibiting a large number of small distinct 
clusters. A study from Kaur and Singh (2016) reported 
that disconnected networks often result from distrust 
in information sources. Consistent with their finding, 
more than half of the COVID-19 information was 
generated by non-professional users, increasing 
the likelihood of encountering false information and 
thereby potentially spreading misinformation.
Moreover, dominant involvement of non-
professional users was observed in the information 
dissemination process. In both the retweet and 
mention networks, communication professionals 
were only marginally involved and there were almost 
no health professionals among the disseminators. 
Since publicly shared information has a direct impact 
on the development of public behaviors, it is very 
important to consider the type of people who act 
as information disseminators during medical crises 
(Hilton and Hunt, 2011; Staniland and Smith, 2013). 
Findings by Keshvari et al. (2018) warned about 
biased and misleading content that ordinary people, 
who are not trained to objectively perceive risks and 
benefits, disseminate with personal speculations and 
interpretations during epidemics. Communication 
professionals, on the other hand, are trained to 
investigate all possible aspects and implications of 
information before promoting the information. In this 
process, communication professionals are often 
dependent on health professionals to substantiate 
facts and provide balance by ensuring pluralistic 
aspects and implications of the pandemic (Ahlmén-
Laiho et al., 2014). Increasing willingness on the 
part of communication professionals to disseminate 
accurate information and to cooperate with health 
professionals, may be critical to control the spread of 
dis/misinformation and prevent public confusion.
In both the retweet and mention networks, 
information flow was highly concentrated within a 
core cluster, comprised of a few influential users 
and their own clusters; information flow to the rest 
of the network (the other clusters) was severely 
restricted due to the limited connectivity. This 
suggests that the networks facilitate the diffusion of 
COVID-19 information if brokers integrate with their 
communities and clusters. In the context of social 
media communications, the limited connectivity 
between clusters means that networks would break 
into isolated components, separated by redundant 
and unnecessary information and that information 
will, more often than not, be trapped within its own 
cluster. Brokers, on the other hand, create paths for 
information diffusion and make global information 
Table 4. P-values from Fisher’s exact test comparing occupations across user roles 
and between networks.
Retweet Mention Retweet vs. mention
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1. Information 
sources









flow easier to attain, if and when they are activated 
(González-Bailón and Wang, 2016). In a pandemic, 
a balanced approach to centralized control and 
management of information is critical in helping public 
audiences understand the threat and what actions 
should be taken (Homeland Security Council (US), 
2006; Department of Homeland Security, 2018). A 
proper course of action as information brokers must 
be taken by government officials to be complete, 
valid and reliable (Homeland Security Council (US), 
2006; Department of Homeland Security, 2018). Un-
fortunately, however, that was not happening in the 
current Twitter’s COVID-19 communication network. 
Neither the retweet network nor the mention network 
showed enough influence of government officials as 
information brokers; in both networks, information 
flow was primarily maintained by health professionals. 
Developing social media communication guidelines 
for officials and national agencies that offer a starting 
point to foster connections and training to control or 
promote information flow may help ensure effective 
information flow and make necessary information 
timely and accessible to those who need it in the 
process of emergency response.
Both the retweet and mention networks exhibited 
a scale-free hierarchical structure, with unidirectional 
information flow. Due to preferential attachment a 
small number of influential users get, such network 
structures can be much more effective at rapid 
information diffusion for timely response and national 
solidarity during crises (Himelboim et al., 2017; De 
Brún and McAuliffe, 2018); because a small number 
of influential users can command a large and 
disproportionate number of other users and those 
users then will affect all the other users in their local 
network, a whole subsystem can be covered in just a 
few steps, making it relatively easier to keep everyone 
informed of relevant information such as risks and 
action items. At the same time, however, such 
network structures can also be vulnerable to false 
information and its diffusion can be easily distorted 
by just one or a few influential users’ absence in the 
network (Lossio-Ventura and Alatrista-Salas, 2017; De 
Brún and McAuliffe, 2018); for instance, if one or two 




influential users were removed or left the network, it 
would leave a major gap in support for most users 
thus interrupting information flow; similarly, a single 
piece of misinformation can be a risk factor for the 
entire system because of the fast nature of information 
dissemination. Monitoring information flow and 
ensuring that the public can rely on a consistently 
valid source of information via controlled channels 
at all stages of a pandemic communication planning 
may help the emergency communication network be 
more resilient and stable.
The visualization results suggested that influential 
users in the retweet and mention networks may 
have different reasons to engage in COVID-19 
communication. Different interaction patterns and 
preferences in interaction form in Twitter networks 
have been previously shown to result in part from 
differences in the type of messages, which may reflect 
the reasons users engage in the communication 
(Conover et al., 2011; Himelboim et al., 2017). Conover 
et al. (2011) found that, in Twitter’s political discourse 
where the retweet network was highly polarized while 
the mention network was not, users tended to retweet 
other users whom they agreed with politically, while 
they interacted with users whom they disagreed with 
more frequently using mentions to argue or share their 
views. COVID-19’s retweet and mention networks 
did not exhibit the same connectivity among users. 
Interacting closely, influential users in the retweet 
network shared information with each other, and the 
interactions among influential users facilitated less 
influential users’ access to information by connecting 
each of their clusters in the network. In contrast, the 
absence of interactions among influential users in the 
mention network led to the more limited information 
flow across clusters. Studies are needed to investigate 
whether and how differences in information flow 
tendencies in health communication represent 
differences as a function of information type.
Limitations
This study has some noteworthy limitations. Data 
collection was restricted to English messages, 
which may limit generalizability to other languages. 
The study was unable to access private networks – 
only publicly available tweets were retrieved for the 
analyses. Although a majority of Twitter users (87%) 
reported they keep their accounts public (Wojcik 
and Hughes, 2019), the findings may not reflect 
the characteristics and attitudes of private users. 
Many additional aspects of information diffusion 
regarding the topic of COVID-19 were not captured 
by the indicators of information sharing – retweets 
and mentions. For example, the current study did 
not include followers-followees structure since it has 
been reported that influential users are those who 
have an active audience who mentions or retweets 
the users, instead of the large number of followers 
(Cha et al., 2010) and the number of followers/
followees does not fully explain users’ actual activities 
(Hamzehei et al., 2017); however, it may be possible 
that the structure explains other aspects such as the 
impact of the information shared. The current version 
of the Twitter API does not store users who retweet 
retweeters. A prior study on information spread on 
the retweet network connection identified that most 
(91%) of retweets are directly retweeted from the 
initial message (Liang et al., 2019). However, the 
unavailability of the full content record may prevent 
us from further knowing the pattern of information 
diffusion among intermediate retweeters. There are 
no comparable analyses to determine cut-off values 
of network indices to be high or low. Thus, our only 
basis was our own interpretation of the data. Social 
networks are often only weakly scale-free even in 
cases where the power-law distribution is observed 
(Broido and Clauset, 2019). Future research should 
investigate the robustness of the scale-free structures 
and interpretability of power-law distribution. Drawing 
inferences solely based on a visual inspection 
requires further statistical confirmation.
Conclusion
This study examined the COVID-19 communication 
network on Twitter to provide insights about health 
information flow among Americans during a pandemic. 
Structural characteristics of retweet and mention 
networks were quantified and described with different 
metrics (size, density, connectivity, modularity). Influential 
users (information sources, disseminators, brokers) 
in each network were identified and the nature of the 
influential users were conceptually assessed. Results 
showed that in both retweet and mention networks, 
the topic of COVID-19 created large fragmented Twitter 
populations into multiple communication channels, 
each with its own audience and information sources. 
The study also found the absence of reliable sources, 
disseminators that can provide timely, accurate 
information, and proper management of information 
flow. These results have implications for understanding 
and predicting information diffusion in urgent 
public health communication. Overall, the findings 
emphasized the importance of connecting users to 
the essential resources and distinguishing credible 
information among a huge amount of information 
being shared. As social media becomes a more 
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heavily used news source, the effectiveness of crisis 
management depends more on the type of information 
shared among its users and the user reachability in 
the network. Our work opens several new questions 
about the underlying structures of social media 
communication network. Future studies may expand 
this research, exploring how user clusters are formed 
and examining how relationships between information 
type and degree of influence differ by cluster or change 
over time.
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